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The credit crunch and the recession
have made economics unusually
prominent in public attention. Even
Britain’s monarch, Queen Elizabeth II,
has asked ‘why did no one see it
coming?’ And it was Centre for
Economic Performance (CEP) researcher
Luis Garicano who got to answer the
question, both directly when he met
the Queen at the November opening of
the LSE’s New Academic Building and in
a piece in The Guardian.*
Garicano is currently directing CEP’s
research programme on productivity
and innovation, which provides the
cover story for this CentrePiece.
Weightlifting competitions might seem
a somewhat obscure topic. But the
sport’s reward systems – which are
based on relative rather than absolute
performance – are remarkably similar
to the incentives for people in financial
institutions that led to excessive risk-
taking and ultimately caused so much
economic damage.
Two other articles in this issue
relate even more closely to the global
crisis. And both belie the notion that
economics is always a ‘dismal science’.
Ralf Martin believes that the economic
crisis provides a great opportunity to
tackle the climate change crisis. He
argues that environmentally friendly
fiscal stimuli and tax reforms can save
both the economy and the planet.
And Nick Bloom, who long before
the financial market turmoil of last
autumn suggested that the rise in
uncertainty since August 2007 would
lead to a significant slowdown, 
now reports a fall in uncertainty. 
This makes him a rare optimist: he
claims the recession will be over sooner
than you think.
There’s plenty more provocative
stuff. Having compared railway
performance today and in the Victorian
era, Tim Leunig says we should learn
from our forbears’ responsiveness to
customer demand. He calls for a more
rational allocation of investment in
train services, one focused on
upgrading busy if unglamorous
commuter lines instead of high-profile
intercity links.
Henry Overman, director of the
recently launched Spatial Economics
Research Centre (SERC), follows up
Leunig’s controversial Policy Exchange
report on failed urban regeneration in
the North with a careful explanation of
what drives Britain’s regional divide.
And in the latest of our ‘big 
ideas’ series, we return to a CEP 
finding that has consistently attracted
public attention – the fall in
‘intergenerational mobility’ between
the 1958 and 1970 British birth cohorts.
Jo Blanden traces the evolution of the
Centre’s research on mobility, and its
interaction with central policy debates
of the past few years about poverty,
inequality and children’s life chances.
Romesh Vaitilingam
Editor
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T
hink of the following
situations: senior executives
within a firm vying to be
promoted to chief
executive; pharmaceutical
companies trying to be first to patent the
cure for a disease; money managers trying
to beat the market; track athletes
competing in the Olympics. What is 
the common characteristic across all 
these activities?
Winning in all these different
environments depends on participants’
relative performance. In other words, it
does not matter how good you are in
absolute terms – for example, how fast
you can run 100 metres – but whether
you can run faster (even by a hundredth
of a second) than your competitors.
What’s more, the reward for winning
is often substantial: the pharmaceutical
firm that discovers a new drug can
generate monopoly profits for the life of
the patent; the manager of the fund with
the highest returns will not only be
rewarded generously but his fund will also
receive the majority of new investments;
and the gold medallist will not only gain
fame but more sponsorship than any 
other athlete.
There are many examples of such
‘tournaments’, where rewards are fixed in
advance, concentrated at the top and
based on relative rather than absolute
performance. 
Economic analysis of the incentives
these tournaments create and their effects
on participants’ efforts indicates two
outcomes. First, the bigger the prize for
victory, the more effort the competitors
put in; and second, in settings where there
is a single winning prize, the prize
awarded to the winner increases with the
number of competitors (see Lazear and
Rosen, 1981; Green and Stokey, 1983,
and Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983). Evidence
from both sports and corporate life
broadly confirms these predictions. 
OK on effort, but what 
about risk?
But in practice, competitors often do not
only choose their effort: they also have to
decide between more or less risky
strategies. For example, a pharmaceutical
firm that is lagging behind in a patent
race may start exploring more risky
projects; and a money manager with
below market returns might start investing
in more risky assets.
Taking a more risky strategy may have
worse outcomes on average, but it may be
the only hope a laggard has to win the
competition. Whether it makes sense also
depends on the options available to the
leader, and on whether competitors can
observe each other’s strategies.
Unfortunately, economic theory offers
ambiguous predictions about what
happens when competitors are able to
choose both their effort and the riskiness
of their strategies. What’s more, it is rarely
possible to observe the risk and effort
Many areas of economic activity take the form
of ‘tournaments’, where what matters is your
performance relative to the performance of
others. To assess the effects of such reward
systems on participants’ performance and the
risks that they take, Christos Genakos and
Mario Pagliero look at the behaviour of
professional weightlifters.
Weightlifting 
competitions:
lessons for performance management
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decisions that participants take. How
could we possibly know whether the
senior executives in a firm are following a
more or less risky strategy, or whether the
athletes in a race are taking more or less
risky actions?
Despite the importance of the issue,
there is little empirical evidence on
competitors’ risk-taking, effort choices and
performance in environments with
tournament-like incentives. As a result,
most of the evidence to date comes from
laboratory experiments. Our research looks
at non-experimental data from
weightlifting competitions to examine
professional athletes’ choices about effort
and risk-taking in a tournament setting.
Weightlifting, a sport where
competitors attempt to lift heavy weights
mounted on steel bars, has the unique
characteristic that athletes have to
announce in advance the amount they
intend to lift. In other words, it is possible
to observe not only whether athletes’
efforts to lift a given weight are successful,
but also, since attempting to lift a heavier
weight is riskier, the strategy that they
follow.
We analyse round-by-round data on
the performance of professional
weightlifters in international
championships, including the Olympics,
between 1990 and 2006. The panel
dimension of our data allows us to control
for multiple sources of unobserved
heterogeneity at the athlete, competition
or year level.
What’s more, the multistage nature of
the competitions allows us to estimate our
parameters of interest simply by observing
the behaviour of athletes during a given
competition. For example, we can
investigate whether a given athlete ranked
first takes the same risks as when ranked
eleventh, and whether the probability of a
successful lift for a given weight is
different for an athlete depending on his
current rank in the tournament.
A lesson or two from 
the professionals
We establish two main results. First, 
risk-taking exhibits an inverted U-
relationship with rank: risk-taking
increases up to rank six and then
monotonically decreases moving towards
the bottom of the ranking. In other words,
the same athlete will attempt to lift a
heavier weight (0.8kg or 51% more than
the average discretionary incremental
announcement) if he is ranked sixth than
if he is ranked first.
Although the athlete would be
awarded a higher score if he were to lift
the weight successfully, the chance of a
successful lift decreases, indicating that he
is willing to take more risk. In contrast, if
the same athlete drops from being ranked
sixth to eleventh, his attempted weight
will decrease by 0.2kg (or 13% of the
average discretionary incremental
announcement), indicating that he is
willing to take less risk.
Athletes try to protect their position
with relatively safe strategies when leading
the competition. Risk-taking is highest
when there is a chance of winning a
medal, and lowest towards the bottom of
the ranking when the chances of reaching
the top are slim.
The concentration of rewards at the
top also suggests that tournaments with
these characteristics encourage
participants to take more risks overall.
Indeed, we find that there is more risk-
taking in more prestigious competitions
like the Olympics, where the rewards are
higher.
Second, we find that the probability of
a successful lift, conditional on the chosen
weight, increases moving down the
rankings. In other words, an athlete has a
lower probability of successfully lifting a
given weight if he is ranked first than if he
is ranked eleventh.
This is surprising. Given the structure
of prizes, we would expect athletes to be
more motivated and exert more effort
when ranked near the top, where the
reward for a successful lift is significantly
higher, so that the probability of lifting a
given weight increases when an athlete is
higher ranked.
This finding suggests that athletes may
perform badly under pressure, even
though motivation and effort may be
high. Such an interpretation is consistent
with anecdotal evidence that athletes’
performance may indeed deteriorate when
the importance of a successful lift
increases – a phenomenon known as
‘choking under pressure’.
We show that athletes do ‘choke’
more frequently in more prestigious
competitions or when the competition
becomes tougher (in the sense that there
are more athletes with similar
performance). We also find evidence that
‘choking under pressure’ affects both
experienced athletes (those who have
already won a medal or previously
participated in international competitions)
and inexperienced athletes. This is in sharp
contrast to previous research in
behavioural economics, which highlights
the importance of experience in
overcoming psychological biases.
Finally, we contribute to the broader
debate on tournaments by measuring the
impact of a counterfactual reward system.
Specifically, we consider a piece-rate
contract, in which each athlete is
rewarded at each stage in proportion to
the overall amount successfully lifted. This
is similar to many workplaces, in which
workers are paid based on their absolute
performance.
Our analysis reveals that tournaments
encourage more risk-taking than this
linear reward scheme. If a piece-rate
system were used in weightlifting, athletes
Managers 
may use
‘tournaments’
to induce 
risk-averse
workers to 
take risky – 
but potentially
profitable –
strategies
Tournament-like
incentives can 
be too successful
in encouraging
risk-taking,
leading to
excessive 
risk and lower
average
performance
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would attempt to lift smaller weights and
they would succeed with higher
probability. On average, the incentives
provided by the tournament decrease the
overall total of successful lifts, but it
increases the probability of some
outstanding performances (which may be
what the spectators want to see).
Careful with those bonuses…
Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has blamed
the ‘unconscionable’ system of generous
bonuses paid to investment bankers for
exacerbating the global credit crisis: ‘The
system of compensation almost surely
contributed in an important way to the
crisis. The system was designed to
encourage risk-taking – but it encouraged
excessive risk-taking. In effect, it paid
them to gamble.’
Overall, our findings suggest that
tournament-like incentives – such as
promotions and bonuses – can change
workers’ behaviour and could be a
powerful tool in the hands of capable
managers. Individual workers are typically
more risk-averse than large corporations:
since they typically only have one job, it is
understandable that they do not want to
risk it. Managers may use tournaments to
induce risk-averse workers to innovate,
experiment and ultimately take risky – but
profitable – strategies. 
On the other hand, our results show
that tournaments can be too successful in
encouraging risk-taking, leading to
excessive risk and lower average
performance. While this may be ideal in
sport, in which suspense and extraordinary
performances are what the spectators
want, it may not be so desirable within
firms. If firm profitability is affected more
by average performance than by the rare
exceptional performance of a few
individuals, then tournament-like
incentives may encourage unconscionable
risk and reduce overall performance. 
This article summarises ‘Risk Taking and
Performance in Multistage Tournaments:
Evidence from Weightlifting Competitions’ by
Christos Genakos and Mario Pagliero, CEP
Working Paper No. 1656.
Christos Genakos is a lecturer in economics
at Cambridge University and a research
associate in CEP’s productivity and
innovation programme. Mario Pagliero is
assistant professor at the University of Turin
and the Collegio Carlo Alberto.
Further reading
Edward Lazear and Sherwin Rosen (1981)
‘Rank-order Tournaments as Optimum Labor
Contracts’, Journal of Political Economy
89(5).
Jerry Green and Nancy Stokey (1983) 
‘A Comparison of Tournaments and
Contracts’, Journal of Political Economy
91(3).
Barry Nalebuff and Joseph Stiglitz (1983)
‘Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General
Theory of Compensation and Competition’,
Bell Journal of Economics 14(1).
Relative performance
evaluation schemes 
may induce the
phenomenon of ‘choking
under pressure’, lowering
overall performance
Big ide
O
n 23 June 2008, the
Prime Minister gave a
flagship speech to school
leaders in which he said
that ‘raising social
mobility in our country is a national
crusade in which everyone can join and
play their part’. In January 2009, his
government published a White Paper 
on social mobility.
The opposition parties share the desire
for more mobility, with Conservative
leader David Cameron pledging in
December 2006 to take ‘the banner of
sensible, centre-right reform’ to the
issue of social mobility and the Liberal
Democrats supporting their own
independent Social Mobility Commission.
The rise of social mobility up the policy
agenda has coincided with a series of high
profile studies from CEP researchers. As
Stephen Machin’s ‘big ideas’ article in the
previous issue of CentrePiece showed, 
CEP played an important role in describing
the evolution of cross-sectional wage 
and income inequality during the 1980s
and 1990s.
At the same time, related projects laid
the foundations for an enduring research
strand on intergenerational mobility. In
1997, Lorraine Dearden, Stephen Machin
and Howard Reed followed up influential
work in the United States by estimating
the extent to which sons’ and daughters’
earnings at age 33 are associated with
their father’s earnings for a cohort born 
in 1958. 
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In the third of CEP’s ‘big ideas’ series, Jo Blanden
traces the evolution of CEP research on social mobility
and its interaction with policy debate.
Intergenerational m
The rise of social
mobility up the
policy agenda has
coincided with a
series of high
profile studies from
CEP researchers
as
obility
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The approach taken by economists 
to measuring intergenerational income or
earnings mobility is relative. The most
straightforward description of mobility
uses a ‘transition matrix’, which divides
the income distribution of the parents’
generation into equal-sized groups 
(usually fifths or quarters) and shows the
proportion of the next generation that
moves into a higher income group, the
proportion that goes down and the
proportion that stays the same.
Movement away from the starting
point is seen as mobility. Notice that in
using this approach, upward mobility
equals downward mobility; if some
children move up, others must go down. 
One of the problems with the
transition matrix is that it is unable to take
account of the extent of movements
within groups. If those moving from the
first to second quartile are just tipping
over the boundary between the two
groups, there is less mobility than if they
are moving into the middle or top of their
new group.
To overcome this limitation,
economists also adopt a regression
approach, which takes account of all the
mobility between generations. This
produces the ‘intergenerational elasticity’:
a result of 0.3 would say that on average
a 10% difference in income between two
sets of parents would be passed on as a
3% difference in income between their
children. This statistical approach is also
based on an entirely relative conception of
mobility; the amount of upward and
downward mobility balance. 
The research by Dearden et al (1997)
presented a picture of limited mobility in
the UK, with results similar to those for
the United States, although the study did
not make an explicit comparison. At
around the same time, CEP researchers
Paul Gregg, Susan Harkness and Stephen
Machin undertook a two-stranded project
for the Joseph Rowntree Foundation.
The first component of their study
used the Family Expenditure Survey to
conduct an extensive analysis of the time-
patterns of child poverty in the UK.
Unsurprisingly, given our knowledge of
what happened to the wage distribution
over this period, the child poverty rate had
risen sharply in the 1980s.
The second part of the study showed
how strongly family background
influenced children’s development and
later outcomes. This reinforced the
message from the intergenerational
mobility analysis that experiencing low
income in childhood could have a
profound impact on later achievement.
The Gregg et al (1999) analysis had a
powerful influence on future policy-
makers. At the time, the New Labour
government was finding its new policy
agenda, rejecting the ‘Old Labour’ values
of equality of outcome in favour of a new
focus on equality of opportunity.
The message from CEP research at the
turn of the century was that
intergenerational persistence in the UK
was substantial and that high rates of
child poverty painted a bleak picture for
the future of British children. It seemed
natural to put these two facts together to
ask a new research question: how had the
influence of parental background changed
as the rates of child poverty increased? 
With the release of reliable earnings
data from the 1970 British birth cohort in
2000, a comparison of intergenerational
mobility over time in the UK became
possible, comparing the 1970 cohort with
their counterparts born in 1958. Research
on these two cohorts measured the
association between the income of
parents (when their children were aged
16) and the earnings of children in theirCEP’s 1999 analysis
had a powerful
influence at a 
time when the
government was
rejecting ‘Old
Labour’ values of
equality of outcome
in favour of a new
focus on equality 
of opportunity
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early thirties. The association was found to
be stronger for the later cohort growing
up in the 1980s than for the first cohort
who grew up in the 1970s.
The message from these data was 
that the rise in inequality and child poverty
had coincided with a fall in social mobility.
This study was published in 2004 in a
book edited by Canadian economist 
Miles Corak. 
The finding that mobility had declined
was well-timed, with initial versions of the
findings (presented to the Royal Economic
Society at Warwick in 2002) attracting
widespread media attention. This interest
peaked in 2005 when the findings were
presented as a summary report for the
Sutton Trust.
The tendency of the media at the time
was to sum up the research with the
headline ‘Social mobility in the UK is
falling’. While convenient for newspaper
editors, this was actually misleading,
implying that the fall observed over the
12-year period in question continued over
the following 20 years. Researchers will
not be able to evaluate this properly for
another couple of decades, although a
recent follow-up study by Blanden and
Machin (2008) suggests that the degree of
mobility is unlikely to change between the
cohorts born in 1970 and 2000. There is
certainly no evidence at this stage of the
situation continuing to deteriorate. 
Hot on the heels of the finding that
intergenerational mobility had declined
came the search for insights into why this
had happened. Work by Jo Blanden,
Lindsey Macmillan and Paul Gregg sought
to discover more about this, using a
framework that considered the
relationship between parental income
and children’s earnings developing out of
a two-stage process.
First, parental income relates to
children’s characteristics, that is, those
with better off parents have more
education; and second, these
characteristics are rewarded in the labour
market, that is, those with a better
education earn more. Using the rich data
in the British cohorts, the study found that
the great majority of the increase in
intergenerational persistence could be
accounted for the strengthening of the
relationship between parental income and
children's performance throughout the
education system.
The results discussed above are all
based on relative income mobility; this is
certainly not the only measure of ‘social
mobility’. There is a long history in the UK
of measuring social mobility by observing
changes in social class within dynasties.
Social class has tended to be measured by
fairly large groupings of occupations (say
seven); as with the transition matrix
approach this may obscure substantial
amounts of mobility within classes.
Another issue is that there is clear
change in the social class structure over
time due to old occupations dying out and
new ones emerging. This means that
social class analysis can explore two
dimensions of social mobility. First,
absolute mobility considers the question
‘are individuals in better class occupations
than their parents?’ Second, relative
mobility is about the extent to which there
are movements between classes that are
not driven by the overall changes in the
class structure.
The sociologist John Goldthorpe (of
Nuffield College, Oxford) and co-authors
have been tracing the progress of social
class mobility in the UK and the rest of
Europe for several decades, in general
emphasising similarity across nations and
stability within them. Investigations by
Goldthorpe and Jackson (2007) and
Erikson and Goldthorpe (2008) of changes
in mobility using the 1958 and 1970
cohorts demonstrate that there has been
no change in relative mobility when social
class is used as the outcome measure.
The difference in results between the
sociological and economic approaches has
led to a lively and productive debate, with
the sociologists asserting that the
differences are due to weaknesses in the
measurement of family income in the
cohort studies. Using a number of
approaches, Blanden et al (2008)
demonstrate that measurement error is
not the issue. Instead, they explain the
results in terms of the large inequalities in
family income that are found within the
broad social class groupings used by
sociologists; in light of these, there is no
reason to suppose that the two
methodologies should find similar results. 
The dialogue between sociologists 
and economists has certainly helped to
sharpen the policy debate on mobility.
Many political speeches have made
reference to ‘social mobility’ without a
clear conception whether they are
referring to absolute or relative mobility,The central
message from data
on the 1958 and
1970 British birth
cohorts was that
the rise in
inequality and
child poverty had
coincided with 
a fall in social
mobility
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and mobility measured by income or social
class. With contributions from both
sociologists and economists, the recent
Cabinet Office discussion paper ‘Getting
On, Getting Ahead’ has helped to clarify
the meaning of social mobility and has
therefore set the scene for more
transparent policy-making in the White
Paper on social mobility. 
In June 2008, a number of CEP
researchers (both past and present)
attended the Sutton Trust and Carnegie
Foundation’s trans-Atlantic summit 
on social mobility in New York, an event
star-studded with top academics and
policy-makers.
Jo Blanden gave the opening
contribution, which compared the levels of
mobility across countries using a variety of
methodologies, emphasising what can be
learned from taking a multidisciplinary
approach, and demonstrating the
correlation between low levels of mobility
and high levels of income inequality.
Sandra McNally discussed the contribution
that schools policy could make to
promoting mobility, and Stephen Machin
appeared on the policy roundtable
alongside cabinet minister Ed Miliband. 
The New York summit was followed
by a one-day conference at CEP, which
presented some of the cutting-edge work
on intergenerational mobility currently
being carried out in Europe. Again, 
there was a strong policy focus to
proceedings. More information about the
discussion can be found in the previous
issue of CentrePiece. 
In conclusion, there has been a
justified focus on the finding that
intergenerational mobility fell in the UK
between the 1958 and 1970 cohorts.
But this is not the only contribution made
by CEP researchers to our understanding
of social mobility.
Indeed, CEP contributions predate this,
with our researchers being among the first
to document the strong association
between family background and later
achievements in the context of the UK’s
high child poverty rates. CEP contributions
have also moved the debate past the fall
in mobility, to investigate ‘what happened
next’, and to consider the relationship
between different measures of mobility
and what these might mean for policy. 
It is also clear that the research on
intergenerational mobility discussed here
relates closely to the work on cross-
sectional inequality reviewed in the
previous issue of CentrePiece. Our interest
in intergenerational mobility is in part
encouraged by the recognition of the 
UK’s high inequality levels and exceptional
child poverty rates.
More recent work has attempted to
understand more about the link between
inequality and mobility, both in terms of
how inequality may influence different
measures of social mobility, and more
profoundly whether greater inequality in a
nation leads directly to less social mobility.
Further reading
Jo Blanden (2008) ‘How Much Can We Learn
from International Comparisons of Social
Mobility?’, invited paper written for the
Sutton Trust summit on social mobility.
Jo Blanden, Alissa Goodman, Paul Gregg and
Stephen Machin (2004) ‘Changes in
Intergenerational Mobility in Britain’, in Miles
Corak (ed.) Generational Income Mobility in
North America and Europe, Cambridge
University Press.
Jo Blanden, Paul Gregg and Lindsey
Macmillan (2007) ‘Accounting for
Intergenerational Income Persistence:
Non-cognitive Skills, Ability and Education’,
Economic Journal 117: C43-60.
Jo Blanden, Paul Gregg and Lindsey
Macmillan (2008) ‘Intergenerational
Persistence in Income and Social Class: The
Impact of Within-class Inequality’, mimeo.
Jo Blanden and Stephen Machin (2008) ‘Up
and Down the Generational Income Ladder in
Britain: Past Changes and Future Prospects’,
National Institute Economic Review 205:
101-17.
Lorraine Dearden, Stephen Machin and
Howard Reed (1997) ‘Intergenerational
Mobility in Britain’, Economic Journal 107:
47-64.
Robert Erikson and John Goldthorpe (2008)
‘Income and Class Mobility between
Generations in Great Britain: The Problem of
Divergent Findings from the Data-sets of
Birth Cohort Studies’, mimeo.
John Goldthorpe and Michelle Jackson (2007)
‘Intergenerational Class Mobility in
Contemporary Britain: Political Concerns and
Empirical Findings’, British Journal of
Sociology 58: 526-46.
Paul Gregg, Susan Harkness and Stephen
Machin (1999) ‘Poor Kids: Trends in Child
Poverty 1968-1996’, Fiscal Studies 20(2):
163-87.
Paul Gregg and Stephen Machin (2000)
‘Childhood Disadvantage and Success and
Failure in the Labour Market’, in David
Blanchflower and Richard Freeman (eds)
Youth Employment and Joblessness in Advanced
Countries, University of Chicago Press.
CEP contributions
have moved the
debate past the fall
in mobility, to
investigate ‘what
happened next’ and
whether greater
inequality in 
a nation leads
directly to less
social mobility
Jo Blanden is a lecturer in economics at the
University of Surrey and a research associate
in CEP’s education and skills programme.
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Many pundits are warning that the current dire recession
will persist well into 2010. We would have agreed with
them three months ago: indeed, following an article on
the likely impact of the credit crunch in the Spring 2008
CentrePiece, we wrote a VoxEU column in October 2008
predicting a severe recession in 2009.1
Based on the analysis of 16 previous economic shocks, we
forecast a 3% drop in GDP and a three million increase in
unemployment in both Europe and the United States (see
Bloom, 2008, for details). We also worried about a far
worse outcome: Europe and the United States slipping
into another Great Depression due to damaging 
policy responses. But uncertainty appears to have fallen
rapidly over the last couple of months and this outcome
has hopefully been avoided.
Good news: Great Depression II
avoided and growth resumes in 
late 2009
Much like today, the Great Depression began with a stock
market crash and a meltdown of the financial system.
Banks withdrew credit lines and the interbank lending
market froze up.
What turned this from a financial crisis into an economic
disaster, however, was the compounding effect of terrible
policy. The infamous Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 was
introduced by desperate US policy-makers as a way of
blocking imports to protect domestic jobs. Instead of
helping workers, this worsened the situation by freezing
world trade. At the same time, policy-makers were
encouraging firms to collude to keep prices up and
encouraging workers to unionise to protect wages,
exacerbating the situation by strangling free markets.
Uncertainty is now falling
It now appears that the global policy response to the
credit crunch has avoided repeating those mistakes.
Instead, it has focused on delivering a massive dose of tax
and interest rate cuts, and spending increases. Policies
restricting free markets have so far been avoided. This has
calmed stock markets as the fears of an economic
Armageddon have subsided. At the same time, political
uncertainty has dropped as world leaders have begun to
clarify their stimulus plans. In fact, economic uncertainty 
is now dropping so rapidly that we believe growth will
resume in the second half of 2009.
Figure 1 shows one measure of uncertainty – the implied
volatility on the S&P 100 – commonly known as the
‘financial fear factor’. This jumped over threefold after the
dramatic collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
But it has fallen back by 50% since early December as
both economic and political uncertainty has receded.
Other measures of uncertainty have also fallen; this is even
true for the frequency of the word ‘uncertain’ in the press.
As uncertainty falls, the economy 
will rebound
The heightened uncertainty after the credit crunch led
firms to postpone investment and hiring decisions.
Mistakes can be costly, so if conditions are unpredictable
the best course of action is often to wait. Of course, if
A major source of today’s economic weakness is uncertainty that led
firms to postpone investment and hiring decisions. Nick Bloom and
Max Floetotto report that key measures of uncertainty have dropped
significantly, so they believe growth will resume in late 2009.
The recession will be over
sooner than you think
in brief...
Good news: Great Depression II avoided
and growth resumes in late 2009
1 http://www.voxeu.eu/index.php?q=node/2243
every firm in the economy waits, economic activity slows
down (see Bloom et al, 2008). To twist President
Roosevelt’s well-known phrase from the Great Depression,
there is nothing to fear but uncertainty itself.
But now that uncertainty is falling back, growth should
start to rebound. Firms will start to invest and hire again
to make up for lost time. Figure 2 shows our predicted
impact of the spike in uncertainty following the credit
crunch. This is based on our detailed analysis of 
16 previous financial, economic and politically driven
uncertainty shocks. After falling by 3% between October
2008 and June 2009, we forecast GDP will start to
rebound from Autumn 2009 onwards.
So it’s now or never for 
expansionary policy
Many economists make the case for a stronger policy
response. That might be right, but policy-makers need to
act fast. Economic stimulus measures – such as spending
packages, quantitative easings or a couple of rounds of
liquidity injections – have to be enacted quickly.
Dithering over different courses of policy will actually
make things worse by adding uncertainty. This is exactly
what happened in the United States after 9/11 when the
Federal Reserve Board criticised Congress for creating
unnecessary uncertainty with its lengthy debates on
investment tax credits.
Delaying an economic stimulus package until the 
summer may mean that it is too late. The economic
medicine will be administered just as the patient is trying
to leave the hospital.
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Nick Bloom is an assistant professor of economics at
Stanford University and a research associate in CEP’s
productivity and innovation programme. Max Floetotto is a
PhD candidate in economics at Stanford University.
Further reading
Nick Bloom (2008) ‘The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks’,
Stanford mimeo, forthcoming in Econometrica.
Nick Bloom, Max Floetotto and Nir Jaimovich (2008) 
‘Really Uncertain Business Cycles’, Stanford mimeo
(http://www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/RUBC_DRAFT.pdf).
Figure 1:
The ‘financial fear factor’: daily US implied stock market volatility
Figure 2:
The estimated impact of the credit crunch on GDP
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The changing pattern of earnings:
employees, migrants 
and low-paid families
Welfare-to-work policies are based on the idea
that people can work their way out of poverty.
Richard Dickens and Abigail McKnight
explore this assumption by examining the
changing earnings of employees, the integration
of migrants and the progression of low-paid
families in Britain since the late 1970s.
Photo: Stephen Spraggon – www.spraggonphotography.co.uk
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T
he 1980s and early 1990s
saw sharp increases in the
inequality of earnings,
income and the distribution
of work across households.
These changes contributed to large
increases in child poverty so that by 1997
about a third of all British children lived in
relative poverty. Important contributory
factors were concentrations of low skills,
high unemployment and benefits set at
levels that were insufficient to lift families
out of poverty.
Since taking office in 1997, the Labour
government has focused on tackling
poverty through employment,
complemented by increases in benefit
levels for some groups, mainly parents and
pensioners. This has all been based on the
expectation that with the help of some
targeted benefits, individuals can work
their way out of poverty. Our study looks
at whether their progression in the labour
market over the past few years
demonstrates that they have been able to
do so.
One of the Labour government’s
flagship policies, the Working Families Tax
Credit (WFTC), was designed to increase
the incentives to find and stay in work for
individuals in low-income families. Our
research looks at the impact of the WFTC
on the extent to which individuals remain
in employment (job retention) and wage
growth.
Recent migrants are known to be
disadvantaged in the labour market, both
in terms of finding work and the wages
they receive when in work. We examine
this group to assess changes in the ‘pay
penalty’ across different migrant groups
and look at the time it takes for their
earnings to catch up with those of their
British-born counterparts and how this has
changed since the late 1970s.
The analysis is based on a unique
administrative data source, which has
tracked the same large random sample of
individuals since the late 1970s to the
present day. The Lifetime Labour Market
Database contains a wealth of information
on individuals’ labour market status, their
annual earnings and receipt of a range of
benefits. It includes information on
personal characteristics, including 
migrant status.
Earnings inequality/mobility
To assess the impact of the unequal
distribution of work and the unequal
distribution of earnings for those who are
in work, we examine changes in the
inequality of annual earnings – variation in
the amount that individuals earn over a
year – and earnings mobility for two
groups of individuals: those with secure
patterns of work and a wider group who
experience some years without any
earnings. 
There are many different measures of
inequality and they all have different
strengths and weaknesses. For example,
some measures place greater importance
on differences between those on very high
incomes and those on very low incomes,
while others put more weight on variation
around average earnings. We use a
number of different measures of inequality
to provide a better understanding of how
differences between individuals’ earnings
change over time; decile ratios, Gini
coefficients and three that belong to the
‘general entropy’ class of inequality indices
(see our working papers listed below for
definitions and full results).
The term ‘long-run inequality’ means
the inequality of individuals’ earnings
when they are added up over a number of
years; and ‘earnings mobility’ measures
changes in individuals’ earnings when the
same person is followed over a number of
years. In other words, we compare
inequality in total earnings added up over
a number of years, say four years, with a
measure of earnings in a single year. 
The difference between these two
provides a measure of earnings mobility.  
Changes in the inequality of
annual earnings 1979-2005 
Inequality in annual earnings increased
between 1979 and 2005. It was higher
among women than men, which is likely
to be due to a greater variation in annual
hours worked. But earnings inequality
increased more among men than among
women during this period. 
A number of different measures 
of inequality show increases in inequality
in annual earnings since 1979. There is
some evidence that inequality has 
been gradually falling among women
since 1997.  
The inclusion of individuals with no
earnings from employment in a given year
has the effect of increasing measured
inequality and thus during the recessions
of the 1980s and 1990s and up to 1997,
2000. We think this is likely to be due to
improvements in job retention, improving
the number of months with continuous
employment; increasing earnings both
within years and across years among 
low earners. 
Figure 1 shows mobility measured over
four- and eight-year periods for men and
women using one of our inequality indices
(the Gini coefficient). It shows that
mobility among all individuals, including
those without earnings from employment,
fell until 2000, with increases since then.
There was greater turbulence in mobility
among men but an overall downward
trend until the mid-1990s, followed by an
increase in mobility from 2000.
Migrant pay gaps 
Since we want to explore routes out of
poverty, we look at employment data of
migrants as they have lower rates of
employment and, when in employment,
attain lower average earnings. This places
their families at greater risk of poverty. 
We look at entry pay relative to migrants’
British-born counterparts (the pay gap)
and patterns of convergence in this pay
gap for different groups of migrants, men
and women at different ages and by
country of origin. 
Not only has there been a big increase
in migration into Britain over the last 25
years, but patterns of migration have also
changed over time. Since the late 1970s,
there has been an increase in the
proportion of migrants from Africa and
Central Asia, and large increases from the
European Union’s accession states in
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increases in unemployment translated into
higher levels of inequality. On the other
hand, when employment increased in the
late 1990s, inequality fell. Increases in
employment among women further
reduced inequality. 
‘Long-run inequality’ in
earnings and employment 
Over time, individuals’ earnings change in
absolute terms and relative to other
employees, so that their longer-run
prospects are not necessarily well
represented by a snapshot of their
earnings at a single point in time. A simple
way of looking at the longer-run picture is
to compare the employment status and
earnings of the same individuals at two
points in time. This analysis reveals that:
 People with low annual earnings are
more likely than those with higher
earnings measured in the same year to
have no earnings and to receive
benefits in subsequent years.
 People with no earnings and receiving
benefits are more likely to have low
annual earnings should they re-enter
employment in the future.
 Although there is variation over time
and between men and women, overall
the position at both the bottom and
top of the earnings distribution persists,
with limited long-range upward
mobility for those on low earnings and
receiving benefit, and very little
downward mobility for high earners.
A more complete picture is gained by
using a more sophisticated measure of
earnings mobility. This methodology
summarises individuals’ earnings over a
number of years, measures inequality in
earnings averaged over these years, and
compares it with a single year measure.
This provides a measure of how much
mobility offsets any increase in cross-
sectional inequality (a snapshot of
inequality taken in one year) and can be
used to assess how long-run inequality 
has changed. 
Our results show that mobility among
male earners fell between 1979 and the
mid-1990s; in other words, over this
period there was an increase in the
inequality of lifetime earnings. But there is
also evidence that earnings mobility for
men has started to rise a little since 2000.
For women earners, there was less
variation in mobility than for men over the
same period. While there were some
changes over time, mobility rates were
quite similar in the late 1970s and the
mid-2000s. Again, there is some evidence
that mobility has started to increase since
Figure 1:
Changes in earnings mobility among male and female employees
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After a very long period
of increase, there is
evidence that inequality
is finally falling due 
to increases in
employment among
women in particular
recent years. These factors could easily
affect the average position of migrants in
the labour market.
Our statistical model, controlling for
age and current year, shows that when
migrant workers first arrive, they
experience a weekly pay gap relative to
their British-born counterparts of over
30% for men and 15% for women. We
find that for migrant men, it takes 20
years on average to eradicate this
difference and for migrant women no
more than six (see Figure 2). The greater
rate of convergence in pay and lower
average pay gap for women may be due
to higher relative weekly hours of work
among migrant women compared with
their British-born counterparts. 
Separate estimates for migrants from
different regions of the world show that
different nationalities experience varying
rates of earnings convergence, with
Europeans catching up the fastest but
Asian men showing few signs of catching
up at all. They also have a higher initial
pay gap, at 45%. 
More recent entry groups of migrants
– those who arrived in Britain in 1985-90
and 1995-2000 – have fared better than
migrants who arrived in 1975-80. But this
is largely because they entered with a
smaller pay gap rather than experiencing
faster pay growth.
The impact of tax 
credits on job retention 
and advancement
The introduction of tax credits in 1999
represented a step change in employment
policy with the launch of an in-work
benefit scheme that had greater coverage
and was considerably more generous than
its predecessors.
The WFTC was designed to make
work pay, even in low-paid jobs, by
supplementing the incomes of low-income
families and so help to reduce child
poverty, moving more people off benefits
into work and reducing the number of
households without any working
members. By making work pay, the idea
was also to improve job retention in low-
paying jobs and assist with advancement
to higher-paying jobs. The introduction of
the WFTC led to an increase in the
number of families receiving in-work
benefits and an increase in the average
value of awards. 
A statistical analysis of job retention
among individuals entering work and
claiming the WFTC, compared with their
counterparts who had claimed Family
Credit, shows that the WFTC did indeed
increase job retention among male
recipients after controlling for differences
in age and entry pay. But our analysis of
earnings growth a year after in-work
benefit recipients entered employment
reveals that the WFTC did not appear 
to increase earnings compared with 
Family Credit. 
Some feared that employers would
take advantage of the tax credit to keep
wage costs down using the tax credit to
subsidise low-paying jobs rather than
boost the incomes of low-paid workers.
There is no evidence that the more
generous WFTC has been used by
employers to keep wage growth down
and this may have been more difficult to
do anyway because of the simultaneous
introduction of the national minimum
wage, which established a wage floor in
the low-wage labour market.
Conclusion
After a very long period of increase, there
is some evidence that earnings inequality
is finally falling due to increases in
employment and a reduction of inequality
among women in particular. Earnings
mobility also appears to be on the increase
after a long period of decline.
Migrants remain disadvantaged in the
labour market. Although the length of
time it takes for wage convergence is
shorter than in the past, this is due to
higher average entry pay rather than
higher convergence rates among migrants
who have arrived more recently.
Tax credits have led to increases in
employment and job retention, raising the
incomes of many low-income families.
This article summarises research by Richard
Dickens and Abigail McKnight funded by the
Joseph Rowntree Foundation
(http://www.jrf.org.uk/knowledge/findings/
socialpolicy/2323.asp). Three background
working papers – ‘Changes in Earnings
Inequality and Mobility in Great Britain
1978/9-2005/6’, ‘Assimilation of Migrants into
the British Labour Market’ and ‘The Impact
of Policy Change on Job Retention and
Advancement’ – are available as occasional
papers on the CEP website and on the
website of the Centre for Analysis of Social
Exclusion (CASE) at LSE.
Richard Dickens is a senior research fellow
in CEP’s labour markets programme and
professor of economics at the University of
Sussex. Abigail McKnight is a senior
research fellow at CASE.
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Figure 2:
Earnings of migrants relative to British-born 
employees, by length of stay
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F
or at least two hundred
years, people have asked of
a society ‘how happy are its
people?’ and likewise of a
policy ‘will it make people
happier?’ Until recently, there was very
little scientific information to answer these
questions. But in the past few decades,
things have changed radically, mainly due
to progress in social surveys, in psychology
and in medical science.
With a few important exceptions,
most of the best work has been done in
the United States. With a view to
launching a major research programme in
Britain, Professors Richard Layard and Paul
Dolan convened an international
workshop on happiness research at CEP in
October 2008.
The programme would combine
fundamental research and applied work
on the effectiveness of different policy
interventions, and include researchers
from economics, psychology, medical
science, philosophy, politics and sociology.
It would make use of the vast mass of
unexploited data on happiness as well as
collecting new data, both experimental
and non-experimental.
The opening presentation at the
workshop was by Professor Daniel
Kahneman of Princeton University, who is
a pioneer in this field of research and the
only psychologist to be awarded the Nobel
Prize in economics, an accolade he
received in 2002. Afterwards, Romesh
Vaitilingam interviewed him about how
we should go about understanding
happiness (or ‘subjective well-being’) as an
indicator of social progress.
Romesh Vaitilingam: You make a
distinction between living and thinking
about it – and between what you call our
‘experiencing-self’ and our ‘remembering-
self’. Could you explain these ideas and
their significance for happiness research?
Daniel Kahneman: We keep insisting
that there is one notion of happiness or
well-being. I argue that we need at least
two. One measurement you obtain when
you ask people how they feel right now –
I call this experience happiness. Another
you obtain when you ask people how they
think about their life – this is life
evaluation.
It turns out that experience happiness
and life evaluation have very different
determinants and very different
consequences. They are both legitimate
parts of well-being but we need to look at
them separately.
RV: You also talk about the focusing
illusion. Could you explain this idea?
Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman talks to
CentrePiece editor Romesh Vaitilingam about
how we should go about understanding
happiness as an indicator of social progress.
Understanding 
happiness:
the distinction between living 
– and thinking about it
CentrePiece Winter 2008/9
DK: What we pay attention to plays a
central role in every aspect of well-being.
You basically enjoy what you attend to:
you may like the idea of being in a luxury
car, but if you are in a luxury car but
quarrelling with your spouse, you are not
enjoying yourself. Indeed, you are better
off not being in a luxury car when you are
quarrelling with your spouse: it does
nothing for you.
So attention is absolutely critical for
your experiencing-self. What you are
paying attention to is also critical when
asked what you think about your life –
your remembering-self. And attention
finally is critical when you are thinking
about life in general or about any aspect
of life. 
Most of us exaggerate the importance
of almost anything as a determinant of
happiness. We think that living in a good
climate is great, we think that having high
income is wonderful and so on. But in fact
people who live in a good climate very
rarely think about it.
The focusing illusion is that when we
think about people living in a wonderful
climate, say in California, we make a
terrible mistake. We imagine somebody in
California who is thinking about living in
California and enjoying living in California
because it is so special. But the amount of
time that people in California spend doing
that is tiny and has essentially no impact
on their well-being.
We need to understand this focusing
illusion and we need to think about the
different aspects of well-being. And we
must give up talking about one notion of
well-being and saying that it doesn't
matter how we measure it. It matters a lot
and different measurements lead to very
different conclusions.
RV: So this must have implications for
how we use surveys to find out about
people's happiness?
DK: Absolutely. Each survey will direct
your attention to different aspects of life.
For example, if you ask people to place
themselves on a ladder of life in which 10
is the best life you can have and 0 is the
worst life you can have, they give you a
very objective assessment of their material
circumstances. And whether they are in
Togo or Denmark, people seem to apply
the same standard for what is a very 
good life.
But asking people ‘how satisfied are
you with your life these days?’ is different.
You are asking them ‘what emotions do
you have when you think about your
life?’, which is not the same thing as
‘what emotions do you experience when
you are living?’ And it is not the same
thing as the judgement they make about
where they fit on the ladder of life. Each
question focuses people’s attention on
different aspects of well-being.
RV: Presumably this has implications for
Most of us
exaggerate the
importance of
almost anything
as a determinant
of happiness
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Hot and cold
seasons in 
the housing
market
The difference in the price
you pay for the same house
in the summer and in the
winter is huge, according to
research by Rachel Ngai
and Silvana Tenreyro.
in brief...
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the way we treat people's unhappiness
and the way we think about public policy
trying to make people happier?
DK: Certainly. The question is which kind
of happiness are you most interested in
promoting and developing: is it the
happiness of the experiencing-self or of
the remembering-self? The interventions
of positive psychology are basically
designed to make people more satisfied
with their lives. That can be very good,
but it is not the same thing as making
them happier as they live.
Another significant issue for policy is
that when we focus on experience, we are
drawn to focus on misery, and rightly so.
Some people in society suffer much more
than others: mentally ill people and people
with physical pain suffer dreadfully.
Focusing on physical pain and depression
as objectives for policy is a direct
consequence of one way of thinking
about well-being.
RV: Do we have enough data at the
moment to be able to distinguish between
the determinants of experience happiness
and of evaluated well-being?
DK: This line of research is developing
very rapidly. We know, for example, that
aspects of material well-being are
extremely important to life evaluation.
When you ask people to evaluate their
lives, they don’t primarily think of their
spiritual well-being, they think of their
material well-being.
On the other hand, we know that the
emotions that people experience within a
population depend a great deal on social
relationships. For example, people are
much happier if they spend a lot of time
with people.
People in a nation are also happier if
they can trust strangers. We know this
from the lost wallet experiment, where
you drop a wallet with an address and see
whether it is returned. There are large
differences between countries in the
likelihood that a wallet will be returned,
and these are correlated with the national
level of corruption and with the national
level of experience happiness. Countries
where the level of trust is higher at any
given level of GDP tend to be happier
countries.
RV: What do you see as the big questions
we need to address in happiness research?
DK: It is very clear at the moment that the
interface of well-being research and health
research is one absolutely critical area.
Research is going to make major advances
in the next decade in understanding the
determinants and the complicated
connections between the happiness of the
remembering-self and the happiness of
the experiencing-self, and the
consequences of these for our health.
Positive
psychology aims
to make people
more satisfied
with their lives 
– this is not the
same thing as
making them
happier as 
they live
The emotions
that people
experience
depend a great
deal on social
relationships
Daniel Kahneman is a senior scholar at the
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and
International Affairs at Princeton University.
More on his research can be found here:
http://www.princeton.edu/~kahneman/
The full audio interview is available here:
http://www.voxeu.eu/index.php?q=node/2581
Every year in
Britain, a housing
boom takes place
from April to
September
followed by a 
bust from October
to March
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W
hile we are all well aware that
house prices and trading activity in
Britain have fallen dramatically in
recent months after a long
upswing, our research finds that
booms and busts don’t just happen over decades. Indeed,
they are as frequent and predictable as the seasons.
Every year in all regions of Britain, as well as in other
European countries, a housing boom of considerable
magnitude takes place from April to September – the ‘hot
season’ – followed by a bust from October to March – the
‘cold season’. 
The fact that house prices in many countries tend to surge
in the summer and stagnate in the winter is glossed over
by house price indices, which are typically presented in
seasonally adjusted form by statistical agencies. For
anyone interested in trends in housing prices, this is a
‘clean’ way to look at the data.
But for actual buyers and sellers, seasonal fluctuations
cannot be glossed over. If you spend £500,000 on a
house in a typical February, you might expect to pay
£515,000 if you waited until June (in addition
to the rent paid for the property in which
you live while waiting, if you are letting,
or the rent forgone, if you could
have let it). Those
many thousands of pounds could have been saved for
better purposes.
This finding raises a natural question: if house prices are
typically higher in the summer, why do most people buy
then? It may be more convenient to move in the summer:
most people get married in this season and young families
may find it easier to search before sending their children
to new schools. But it is not clear that this will be worth
so much money. 
We offer an explanation to the puzzle. Start with the
observation that buyers have different tastes for houses
and that houses vary. To find the ideal house, a buyer has
to spend, at the very least, costly time in searching.
In thick markets (where there are many houses for sale), it
might be easier to find the ideal house, which may not be
available in a very thin market. As a result, buyers prefer
to purchase houses in the summer, so house prices are
slightly higher in the summer, so sellers prefer to put their
houses on the market in the summer – and with more
houses on the market, the market is thicker. 
That means that buyers are more likely to find the exact
house they want and so are willing to pay more. 
With prices higher, more sellers are attracted into the
summer market and so on. This self-reinforcing dynamic
can thus lead to higher prices in the summer and more
market transactions.
A self-reinforcing
dynamic leads to
higher prices in the
summer and more
market transactions
Rachel Ngai is a lecturer in economics at LSE.
Silvana Tenreyro is reader in economics at
LSE. Both are research associates in CEP’s
macroeconomics programme.
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Train times
Are we better than the Victorians at running our railways? 
Tim Leunig investigates.
B
ritain’s railways now carry more people
further than at any point in our peacetime
history. Only the extensive troop
movements of the Second World War kept
the network busier than it is today.
At first sight, this is surprising. In the 19th century, the
railways had no significant competitors for medium or
long distance travel. Today, in contrast, they face huge
competition from cars, coaches and, increasingly,
aeroplanes. So it is worth asking if the performance of
Britain’s railways has improved in the last 150 years.
My research project on this issue – The Effect of
Ownership and Regulation on British Railway Performance,
1850-2006 – comes to two conclusions. First, although
the current regulatory system could be improved, we are
better than the Victorians at regulating private railways.
They used a similar form of price regulation but the
absence of periodic franchising meant that poor
performance then could last far longer than would be
tolerated today. But against that, quality improvements
are much more erratic today.
Given high levels of safety, passengers want their trains to
be fast and on time. Technological improvements and
competitive pressures spurred railways to offer higher
speeds prior to the First World War, and speed remained
an important aspect of quality for much of the twentieth
century, spurring the replacement of steam with diesel
and electric power. 
But after 1970 a different picture emerges. Long-distance
routes continued to get faster, sometimes dramatically so.
But shorter distance routes, particularly commuter routes
into London, stopped getting faster. In fact, on many
routes, particularly south of the Thames, it is now no faster
to commute into London than in the immediate post-war
period, and it is substantially slower than in the 1970s.
This is odd, because London commuters are an ever-larger
proportion of railways passengers. Today, all of the most
important routes, as judged by passenger numbers, are
commuter routes into London. Indeed, the busiest route –
East Croydon to London – is around four times busier
than the principal intercity route – London to Manchester.
We might expect, therefore, that government and rail
companies, nationalised and privatised, would want to see
commuter rail services improve over time. Yet it is London
in brief...
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We are better than
the Victorians at
regulating private
railways – but quality
improvements 
are much more
erratic today
to Manchester – not Victoria to East Croydon, Gatwick
and Brighton – that has received high levels of investment.
It is hard to reconcile this investment pattern with any
sensible definition of the public interest. It is no harder to
upgrade commuter lines than to upgrade the West Coast
mainline. It would benefit more people. It would increase
agglomeration economies in the South East. It might even
pay for itself, since London-bound commuters are
generally affluent, and may well be willing to pay more
for faster trains. And yet it does not happen.
There seems a danger that railway policy in Britain today,
unlike that of the 19th century, is being determined by
politicians and not by customers. Huge levels of public
subsidy to the Channel Tunnel rail link generated good
headlines for ministers. Making busy commuter routes
from Liverpool Street, Victoria and Waterloo a little faster
will not generate the same headlines.
But upgrading commuter lines would be of immense value
to people who use these trains day in and day out.
Equally, it would benefit those people who would like to
live outside London but are currently put off by the time it
takes to commute into the city.
A more rational allocation of railway investment – along
the lines of Sir Rod Eddington’s 2006 report on transport
and the economy – would increase investment on busy if
unglamorous lines. The Victorians would have approved:
while they made mistakes, they were very much focused
on who wanted to travel where. That is a focus
government could usefully rediscover.
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More rational
allocation of railway
investment today
would increase
investment on busy 
if unglamorous lines
Tim Leunig is reader in economic history at LSE and an
associate in CEP’s globalisation programme. This research is
funded by the ESRC as part of its Public Services Programme
(http://www.publicservices.ac.uk/research/237/).
It is now no faster
to commute into
London than in the
immediate post-war
period, and it is
substantially slower
than in the 1970s
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Saving the economy 
and the planet
The current economic crisis may actually offer an opportunity to set the world on
the right track for addressing climate change, writes Ralf Martin. He suggests that
governments should seize this chance to promote pro-environment fiscal stimulus
measures as well as an environmental tax reform.
The current global crisis (economic) and the potential
global crisis (environmental) are connected – or at least
they should be.
Some worry that the current crisis may make an
environmental disaster more likely by making governments
and companies less inclined to implement the necessary
regulatory framework and make the required investments.
As journalist and environmental campaigner George
Monbiot has written, we might be remembered as ‘the
generation that saved the banks and let the biosphere
collapse’.
But there is a more hopeful version of the two-crisis
connectedness. The current mess might actually help us to
address climate change and other environmental
problems.
The global economic crisis as a lesson
in the global ‘tragedy of the commons’
The global economic crisis illustrates how a global system
can suffer from failures that build up slowly over a long
time as a result of behaviour that each set of individual,
institutional and national actors finds rational or at least
politically expedient.
It also shows that such crises can be extremely costly to
address after it is ‘too late’, even those that would be 
relatively cheap to deal with early on. The parallels with
climate change are obvious.
The global response to the economic 
crisis as an opportunity
Another thing the economic crisis has illustrated is that
governments can act quite decisively if necessary. These
days, governments around the globe seem to be
competing in putting together ever more spectacular
rescue packages and fiscal stimuli. Clearly it would be
good if some of these government handouts could come
in the form of much needed investments required for
making the transition to a carbon-free economy.
A good idea for Europe, for example, would be any
contribution towards an integrated superconducting
electricity grid that can simultaneously harness and
distribute solar energy from northern Africa and offshore
wind energy from Northern Scotland and other places (see
http://desertec.org/).
in brief...
Governments should
promote fiscal stimulus
measures that benefit
the environment
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Another suggestion is to have subsidies for improving the
energy efficiency of the housing stock. This would very
directly help homeowners struggling with mortgage
payments as well as the hard hit building industry.
Climate change policies as a 
tax bomb shelter
A big worry with all of such measures is of course that
somebody in the future has to pick up the tab. The UK
opposition parties have accused the government of
heading towards a ‘tax bombshell’. Is this unavoidable? 
It might be that an old policy measure from the
environmental economists’ toolkit is just what
governments need right now to help both the economy
and the planet while avoiding a future tax bombshell. 
It’s called an environmental tax reform.
At present, most tax revenue is derived from taxes on
income and labour. In an environmental tax reform, we
would reduce these kinds of taxes and – in a revenue-
neutral way – levy taxes on energy usage or directly on
greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, rather than taxing
productive activities, we would tax damaging activities
such as pollution.
This would not only make much more economic sense,
but also provide a stimulus for jobs in both the short and
long run. Thus, it would be the ideal policy to implement
now in an effort to boost employment. But even better, it
is also a sustainable stimulus package that does not
require any extra borrowing. 
Fixing the regressive features of
pollution taxes
The standard argument against pollution taxes is that they
are likely to be regressive since poorer people spend a
larger fraction of their income on energy and thereby
pollution. But there are clever ways of dealing with this.
For example, since poorer people receive an even larger
fraction of their income in wages, proceeds from CO2 or
energy taxes could be used to reduce wage taxes
specifically, which would then offset the regressive impact
of pollution taxes.
Some simple arithmetic1 suggests that this could increase
the income of the average wage earner by as much as
21%. Indeed, since the consumption behaviour of poorer
people is also more sensitive to changes in income, this
could actually provide an additional boost for the
economy.
Conclusion
The damage being wreaked by the global economic crisis
is nothing compared with the ‘environmental credit
crunch’ that could occur, at least according to climate
change campaigners. Governments should seize this ‘win-
win’ chance to promote fiscal stimulus that is also pro-
environment.
They should also take the occasion to embrace an
environmental tax reform by reducing wage taxes while
increasing taxes on greenhouse gas emissions. This would
provide a stimulus for employment while keeping
government budgets in balance and contributing to saving
the planet in the long run.
Ralf Martin is a research economist at CEP.
The economic crisis 
might actually help us to
address climate change
1 http://personal.lse.ac.uk/martinr/envpol/papers/taxAppendix.pdf 
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L
ast summer, the thinktank
Policy Exchange caused
controversy with a report 
on urban regeneration. 
In essence, the report
suggested that some places in Britain
(mostly in the North) have lost their raison
d'etre, that regeneration efforts aren’t
making a difference and that we should
build houses (in the South) so that people
can move to places with better
opportunities.
Conservative leader David Cameron,
who was touring marginal Northern
constituencies at the time, dismissed the
report as insane. Government ministers
agreed. The authors faced a barrage of
criticism from offended individuals and
local authorities.
The basic counter-argument goes like
this: ‘I am from [insert name of place]. It's
a lovely place to live because [insert
something nice about the place or
mention the low cost of living]. If you
want to see where [insert name of place]
is heading, just look at the development
of [insert name of nice new buildings].’
These reactions remind us that people
and places are different and that amenities
and cost of living matter as much as
economic opportunities. But they miss a
much more serious question: why do some
regions, cities and communities
prosper while others don’t, and
what, if anything, should government
policy try to do about it?
There is no doubt that economic
activity in Britain is very unevenly
distributed. In 2004, the contribution to
the economy of each individual (gross
value added or GVA per person) in inner
London and in Berkshire, Buckinghamshire
and Oxfordshire was £24,500 and
£23,700 respectively (adjusted for
commuting) – about 40% above the
national average of £17,100.
In the same year, Cornwall and the
Isles of Scilly, West Wales and the Valleys
and the Tees Valley and Durham had GVA
per head of £11-13,000 – 24% or more
below the national average. The
differences would be even more striking if
we considered particular cities or
neighbourhoods within cities.
It is inconceivable that this unevenness
can be explained purely by inherent
differences in physical geography, such as
natural resources. Instead, over time, the
economic system amplifies initial
differences to generate persistent
disparities. This happens because there are
self-reinforcing benefits from the
concentration of activity.
These benefits arise in many different
ways. As long ago as 1890, Alfred
Marshall suggested that spatial proximity
benefits firms and people because it helps
the transfer of knowledge, allows people
and firms to specialise and makes it easier
to trade goods that are costly to transport.
Economic geographers continue to try to
quantify these benefits.
A range of costs offsets the benefits:
Why do some parts of the country prosper while
others don’t – and what, if anything, should
government policy try to do about it? Henry
Overman discusses the regional distribution of
prosperity and the potential policy responses.
Britain’s
regional divide
There is no
doubt that
economic activity
in Britain is 
very unevenly
distributed
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as activity concentrates, the prices of
scarce resources such as land increase,
firms face more competition, roads get
congested, and pollution worsens. The
trade-off between these costs and benefits
determines which areas are rich and which
are poor, which grow fast and which grow
slowly.
Factors like technological change and
globalisation also affect the trade-off, with
fundamental implications for Britain’s
spatial economy. Responses to these
changes are not instantaneous, instead
playing out over time as people and
organisations slowly adjust. And, of
course, government policies shape all
these relationships.
Understanding spatial disparities, and
identifying the appropriate policy
responses, requires a much deeper
understanding of the costs and benefits.
What causes them? Are they changing?
What are the implications? What policy
interventions are effective? Are there
trade-offs between spatial disparities and
economic efficiency? 
As the British government spends
billions of pounds each year on policies for
regional development and urban
regeneration, answering these questions is
of more than academic interest.
Unfortunately, however, getting the right
answers is difficult. There are many
sources of costs and benefits and their
importance differs across individuals, 
firms and locations, raising the possibility
of ‘sorting’: different kinds of individuals
and firms choosing to locate in different
places.
Sorting is a key factor that makes
spatial policy so difficult to get right. 
With sorting, many spatial disparities
simply reflect inequalities in society that
may not be directly or effectively reduced
by spatial policy.
Differences between the North and
South, between Manchester and Leeds,
between Hackney and Westminster
partly reflect decisions by different
people and businesses about 
where is best for them to live, work
or produce. The greater the
difference between the fortunes
of financial services and
traditional manufacturing or
between low- and high-skilled
workers, the greater will be
the likely spatial differences
that result.
Personal inequality in Britain is high
relative to many other European countries,
as is the contrast between the
performance of some of our
manufacturing and financial services. So it
is no surprise that spatial inequalities –
such as ‘postcode lotteries’ in health or
‘North-South divides’ – partly reflect that.
Spatial policy may play a role in
addressing these equity concerns. But
other policies that directly affect the
underlying personal inequalities are likely
to be far more effective.
At the same time, because some
economic outcomes depend on location,
even for similar people or firms, there is
also a role for policy in making the
economy function more efficiently. The
difficulty is determining when this is
happening and what policy might do,
particularly since sorting based on
personal differences means that the
existence of spatial inequalities per se
tells us nothing about whether or not
such effects are important.
We are a long way from a full
understanding of all these issues
and thus from knowing exactly
what policy should do. Personally, I
don’t think that the existing
evidence supports the conclusion
that we ‘should all move south’
(the rather crude interpretation of
Policy Exchange’s message, which led to
so much venom). But, for all the reasons
outlined above, the existing evidence
doesn’t support the idea that we could, or
should, eliminate all spatial disparities (an
equally crude interpretation of
government policy). 
The answer, as usual, is somewhere
between the two extremes. Of course, the
crucial issue is where the balance lies. CEP
research has already played a central role
in advancing our thinking on this issue.
Funding from government and the ESRC
for the new Spatial Economics Research
Centre based at LSE should help this to
continue.
In the current economic climate,
careful research to get the right answers
to these questions and to help formulate
the appropriate policy response matters
much more than whether I think my town
is better than yours.
Henry Overman is reader in economic
geography at LSE, director of the new ESRC
Spatial Economics Research Centre
(http://www.spatialeconomics.ac.uk/) and a
research associate in CEP’s globalisation
programme.
Spatial
differences
partly reflect
decisions by
different people
and businesses
about where is
best for them to
live, work or
produce
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S
hortly after seizing power in 1933, the Nazi
government dismissed all Jewish and ‘politically
unreliable’ scholars from German universities –
roughly a fifth of all scientists. Many of the
dismissed scholars were outstanding members of their
profession, among them the famous physicist Albert
Einstein, the chemist Georg von Hevesy and the Hungarian
mathematician Johann von Neumann.
My research uses data on this unique historical event to
measure the extent of ‘peer effects’ in science – the
degree to which scientists are more productive when
surrounded by able colleagues.
It is not easy to estimate the extra productivity of a
scientist that is generated as a result of their peer group.
The top departments might have the best staff but they
also recruit the brightest prospects. It is thus not clear
whether scientists in departments with outstanding
colleagues are more productive because of the interaction
with these colleagues or simply because the scientists in
these departments are inherently better. 
But because the scientists in Nazi Germany were not
dismissed on the basis of their ability, and because some
departments lost more than half their personnel while
others lost none, this large-scale dismissal offers a ‘natural
experiment’ that makes it possible to tease out the
determinants of scientific productivity.
For example, it is possible to examine the impact of the
dismissals on the peer group of physicists in German
universities after 1933. Interestingly, the majority of the
dismissals occurred in bigger and better departments.
Researchers in affected physics departments experienced a
dramatic loss in the number of peers and average peer
Peer effects in science:
evidence from Nazi Germany
Are university scientists more productive when surrounded by able
colleagues? Fabian Waldinger explores this question by looking at the impact
of the dismissal of scientists by the Nazi government in Germany.
in brief...
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quality as measured by citations of their work in scholarly
books and journals (see Figure 1).
Using this dramatic change in the peer group of the
scientists who stayed in Germany, I investigate peer effects
among these ‘stayers’. Specifically, I investigate whether
the productivity of stayers declined in departments with
many dismissals compared with the productivity of
scientists in unaffected departments. The evidence
suggests that dismissals in a department did not affect the
productivity of stayers (see Figure 2).
Next I investigate peer effects among scientists who had
collaborated very intensively, co-authoring papers before
the dismissals. These co-authors sometimes worked in the
same university but in many cases they worked in a
Scientists in Nazi
Germany whose 
co-authors were
dismissed suffered a
significant loss in
their productivity
Figure 1:
Changes in the peer group of physicists (number and
quality of peers) in Germany following dismissals by the
Nazi government
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Figure 2:
The effect of dismissal on the productivity of stayers
(department-level peer effects)
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Figure 3:
The effect of losing a co-author due to dismissal 
(peer effects among co-authors)
different place. In 1933, some of these ties were severed
because one of the co-authors was dismissed. The
productivity of their co-authors still in Germany declined
by 13-16% as measured by quality-adjusted publications
in top journals (see Figure 3). This suggests strong peer
effects among closely collaborating researchers.
Does any of this matter now? While it is plausible that
localised peer effects are even less important nowadays as
communication costs have fallen dramatically, the same
need not apply to peer effects among co-authors. Indeed,
it is likely that peer effects among co-authors have grown
since the early 1930s as co-authored studies have grown
in importance with increased specialisation and more 'big
science' projects.
So a counterintuitive implication of the research is that
getting the best researchers to work together in the same
departments may not necessarily be the best way to
increase scientific productivity. What does seem important
is facilitating co-authorship by increasing researchers’
exposure to other scientists with similar research interests
from around the world.
This article summarises ‘Peer Effects in Science – Evidence
from the Dismissal of Scientists in Nazi Germany’ 
by Fabian Waldinger, CEP Discussion Paper No. 910
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/dp0910.pdf).
Fabian Waldinger is an occasional research assistant at CEP.
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Co-authorships
should be
encouraged by
increasing
researchers’
exposure to
other scientists
with similar
interests
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